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Individualised Constituency 
Campaigns in Mixed-Member 
Electoral Systems: Candidates in the 
2005 German Elections
THOMAS ZITTEL and THOMAS GSCHWEND
Constituency campaigns are important phenomena fo r  students o f  political parties, 
voting behaviour as well as political communication. These research communities 
perceive constituency campaigns as parts o f  centralised high-tech campaigns aiming in 
strategic ways a t the efficient mobilisation o f  voters. We propose in this paper an 
alternative understanding o f  constituency campaigns using the case o f  the German 
parliamentary elections in 2005 to empirically test this understanding. We perceive 
constituency campaigns as phenomena signalling a relative independence o f  individual 
candidates from  the national party  campaign . We label this phenomenon individualised 
campaigning. We argue that individualised campaigning is driven among others by 
electoral incentives. We test this hypothesis with regard to the German mixed-member 
electoral system  and on the basis o f  a survey o f  all candidates standing fo r  election in 
2005.
Two Different Perspectives on Constituency Campaigns
Election campaigns are traditionally multilevel. One level is national and it 
is populated by political celebrities standing as front runners for their 
parties. Their primary means of communication are the mass media, 
political advertisements and large-scale political rallies. A second campaign 
level is local. It is mostly populated by quite average citizens running on a 
party list or for a direct mandate in a local constituency. They meet their 
potential voters face-to-face on market squares, through visits to companies, 
at social events, or simply through knocking on their front doors. This paper 
is about the relationship between these two levels in the German 
parliamentary election of 2005 and on the way the country’s mixed-member 
voting system patterns this relationship.
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Pippa Norris (2000) identifies in her historical analysis of campaign styles 
a succession of three campaign types in the course of the twentieth century 
which display three distinct patterns in multilevel campaigns: Norris defines 
pre-modern campaigns as being characterised by highly independent and 
intense local campaigns which were hardly connected to the less significant 
national level; modern campaigns are said to emphasise the national level 
and the mass media as a means to address voters while paying little attention 
to the local level; post-modern campaigns are depicted as combining a 
strong focus on the voting district with a high degree of centralised party- 
driven coordination. Denver et a l (2003: 542) put this phenomenon in the 
following way: ‘national party professionals now seek to exercise much 
greater control over local campaigning by managing key constituency 
campaigns in crucial respects and managing them much more closely in the 
national effort’. The peculiar highly centralised character of post-modern 
campaigns has been illustrated through research on campaign tools, 
campaign content, campaign effects and campaign structure.
The increasing use of new communication technologies is a prerequisite for 
directly targeting voters at the constituency level in centralised ways while 
bypassing the mass media as well as the parties’ organisational substructure 
(Rommele 2002). Denver et al. (2003) focus in a study of British election 
campaigns on this aspect of post-modern campaigns. They find a decrease of 
traditional forms of face-to-face campaigning such as doorstep canvassing, 
public meetings and campaign rallies at the constituency level. Their analysis 
shows instead an increase in the use of technologically enhanced and 
mediated campaign tactics such as telephone canvassing, direct mailing und 
computer-based forms of political communication.
Brettschneider (2002) perceives the growing importance of the personal 
characteristics of the frontrunner of a party as an important indicator for 
post-modern campaigns in terms of campaign content. The growing saliency 
of the personal properties as well as the personal background of main 
candidates is assumed to put the political issues on the backburner of 
campaign agendas. The concept of personalisation is largely silent about its 
implications for the constituency level of campaigns. We expect in this 
context efforts to increase the visibility of frontrunners at the constituency 
level on the part of the national campaign.
Students of electoral behaviour such as Denver et a l (2003), Whiteley and 
Seyd (2003), Denver, Hands and McAllister (2004) and Pattie and Johnston 
(2004) focus on the electoral effects of centralised constituency campaigns. 
These authors argue that vital constituency campaigns will have pay-offs for 
the vote shares of political parties. Their data demonstrate for the British 
case increases in campaign activities over time. Differences between 
constituencies are explained by their competitiveness and the aim of British 
parties to strategically target such districts. Such activities are interpreted as 
a particularly valid indicator for the highly strategic character of 
professionalised campaigns aiming to mobilise voters in most efficient ways.
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At the structural level, post-modern campaigns were characterised by 
pointing to new actor constellations at the national level. Farrell and Webb 
(2000) and Poguntke and Webb (2005) perceive post-modern campaigns as a 
source for the presidentialisation of parliamentary systems. They argue that 
the increasing focus on front runners in candidate-centred personalised 
campaigns could trigger a growing gap between the party organisation and 
the parliamentary party on the one hand and the party leader on the other. 
According to Plasser and Plasser (2002: 303-22), post-modern campaigns 
are defined by the emergence of professional campaign consultants. The 
authors demonstrate in a comparative analysis that campaign professionals 
form the core of candidate-centred organisations and that these organisa­
tions remain to be largely independent from the national party head­
quarters.
This paper suggests an alternative perspective on constituency campaigns 
which differs from the one adopted by students of post-modern campaigns. 
We argue that constituency campaigns raise questions regarding the vertical 
axis of party organisation and that their reality might come closer to pre­
modern than to modern times. We see local campaigns as a context for 
individual candidates campaigning in a fairly independent fashion from the 
party they represent. We wish to use the concept of individualised campaigns 
to label this phenomenon.1 Individualised campaigns are characterised in an 
ideal way by candidates who actively seek a personal vote (Cain 1978) on the 
basis of a candidate-centred organisation, a candidate-centred campaign 
agenda and candidate-centred means of campaigning. We do not expect to 
find such ideal patterns in the real world. But we do expect to find 
constituency campaigns that are gradually approaching this ideal and we do 
expect to find differences between different constituency campaigns in light 
of this ideal.
The concept of individualised constituency campaigns contributes to most 
recent writings in the campaign literature. Seyd and Whiteley (2002) for 
example argued with regard to the campaign of the British Labour Party in 
1997 that nationally directed and locally directed campaigns are different 
and that variations in campaign intensity across constituencies were largely 
produced by candidates and local party branches rather than by targeting 
efforts of the national campaign. This claim was contested by Denver and 
Hands (2004) who stressed the vertical integration of Labour’s election 
campaign for the very same election. It goes without saying that the 
question of the vertical structure of election campaigns is of vital 
importance, not only for students of political campaigns, but also for 
students of political parties and political representation.
Our paper aims to further develop the notion of an independent local 
campaign in theoretical and empirical terms and to apply it to a non- 
Westminster democracy such as Germany. The paper is structured in four 
parts. In the first part we will discuss and model the theoretical basis for our 
argument. In the second part we will introduce the data that we use in our
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analysis and we will develop empirical hypotheses on the basis of our 
general theoretical argument. The third part will be devoted to testing these 
hypotheses. The paper concludes by providing a critical discussion of the 
results of our analysis and some speculative remarks regarding the wider 
implications of individualised constituency campaigns.
The Electoral Sources of Constituency Campaigns
What are the factors influencing campaign behaviour? The literature on 
post-modern campaigning perceives technological changes as a crucial 
driving force in the process of the modernisation of election campaigns. 
Swanson and Mancini (1996) stress new media technology as a stimulus 
towards the global convergence of campaign behaviour and campaign style. 
This argument suggests that political parties will increasingly focus on the 
constituency level simply because the technological means are available to 
them. Another line of argument stresses the global diffusion of the American 
model of campaigning through American campaign professionals actively 
promoting new means and strategies of campaigning abroad. This 
explanation of campaign behaviour is related to the concept of the 
Americanisation of campaigning (Butler and Ranney 1992; Holtz-Bacha 
2000; Plasser and Plasser 2002).2
A third explanation of professionalised campaign strategies aims at the 
party in the electorate and at changes in electoral markets. Peter Mair et a i 
(2004) see the structured electoral markets of the past populated by 
homogeneous social groups with strong attachments to particular political 
parties in decline. These social formations are assumed to give way to more 
complex and fragmented social networks that are only weakly associated 
with the political realm and that signal a declining electoral value of party 
labels. Dalton and Wattenberg (2000), Putnam and Pharr (2000) and Dalton 
(20064) have documented this trend empirically on the basis of a number of 
indicators, which need no further discussion or elaboration at this point. In 
the context of our argument it is important to stress the assumed effects of 
these changes on campaign strategies. Mair et al. (2004) perceive these 
changes as crucial incentives for parties to target voters in more 
differentiated and efficient ways and to augment their efforts to constantly 
mobilise weak identifiers though the means of political communication.
Neither of the analyses sketched above denies the persistence of 
disciplined and centralised campaign structures despite the declining value 
of the party label as a heuristic for individual decision-making at the level of 
voters. This is because party organisation and electoral incentives are 
considered key factors for keeping the teams together in spite of flagging 
brand names. We believe that there are indeed good reasons for stressing the 
role of party organisation as a centralising factor in post-modern 
campaigns. Party organisation can be firstly perceived as an endogenous 
factor that works through shared beliefs and policy convictions at the level
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of individual party members (Bowler et al. 1999). If we perceive parties in 
this way, why should we expect candidates who largely share their parties’ 
convictions to defect in their campaign communication? Party organisation 
can be seen secondly as an exogenous factor in predicting campaign 
behaviour. Candidates are dependent on their party for getting nominated 
for public office and thus need to cooperate and function well as good team 
mates. We will come back to this argument in the remainder of the section. 
But we will first take up the case for the electoral sources of post-modern 
campaigns and their potential impact on the individualisation of constitu­
ency campaigns.
The impact of electoral systems on campaign behaviour has been 
discussed among others by Plasser and Plasser (2002: Chapter 5), who 
draw four main conclusions on this subject. They firstly argue in line with 
Bowler and Farrell (1992: 8) and Swanson and Mancini (1996: 17f.) that 
proportional election systems provide strong incentives for party-driven 
centralised campaign strategies. The authors secondly argue with respect to 
systems with preference vote schemes (Sweden, Austria) that the competi­
tion between candidates will be restricted to intraparty competition. They 
thirdly argue with respect to the few plurality systems that we find in 
established European democracies (Britain, France) that even in these cases 
empirical evidence points in the direction of party-driven post-modern 
campaigns. Plasser and Plasser fourthly associate mixed-member electoral 
systems and particularly the German case with the category of proportional 
systems and thus expect party-driven campaigns in this context.
In this paper we take issue with the third and fourth arguments made by 
Plasser and Plasser (2002). We argue with respect to the third argument that 
a lack of behavioural effects in the past does not provide conclusive evidence 
regarding a lack of behavioural effects in the future. This is true for two 
simple reasons. Electoral incentives firstly affect but do not determine actual 
behaviour single-handedly! Electoral incentives can be of marginal impact 
on campaign behaviour in a given structural context along with many other 
incentives affecting the behaviour of political actors at the same time. But 
under the condition of a changing context, marginal electoral incentives 
could become more consequential at the behavioural level while interacting 
with other contextual changes. The impact of electoral system features 
should thus not be written off on the basis of past evidence but should be 
analysed continuously, especially in a changing social and technological 
context. A second reason to be sceptical about the prevailing common 
wisdom concerns the issue of measurement. Plasser and Plasser (2002) 
decide the issue of electoral impact on the basis of a nominal scale, 
distinguishing between individualised and party-driven campaigns. But such 
an approach downplays gradual differences between candidates in a given 
system that could result in highly dynamic developments over time. We thus 
emphasise in this paper the need for a more differentiated form of measuring 
individualised campaigning and respective effects of electoral systems.
Individualised Constituency Campaigns 983
We also take issue with Plasser and Plasser’s reading of the German mixed- 
member electoral system. It runs counter to other accounts in the electoral 
systems literature. Shugart and Wattenberg (2001), for example, stress 
mixed-member systems in the German mould as a distinct type of electoral 
system with distinct behavioural consequences at the voter and the elite 
levels. This is supported by Lancaster and Patterson (1990) or Klingemann 
and Wessels (2001) who find differences in the behaviour of MPs depending 
on their mode of election. Directly elected MPs are more constituency 
oriented than those MPs who have been elected via a party list. This of course 
need not hold true for the area of campaign behaviour. But we see good 
reasons for expecting exactly this kind of impact, as discussed below. We 
assume that the German mixed-member electoral system provides marginal 
incentives to candidates running in single-member districts to adopt more 
individualised campaign strategies compared with list candidates. We further 
assume an increasing impact of these incentives under certain conditions 
defining the structure of the competition at the district level.
We define electoral systems in the following analysis as incentive 
structures which pattern the strategic behaviour of candidates on the basis 
of given goals. In line with models of legislative behaviour, we make the 
following concrete assumptions regarding the behaviour of candidates. We 
assume that the preferences of candidates for political office are ranked in a 
hierarchical way, with the highest priority for the preference of being elected 
or re-elected (Mayhew 1974; Sterna 1997). We further assume that specific 
electoral systems suggest specific strategies to implement this priority (Hall 
and Taylor 1996). The crucial assumption in this respect is that specific 
campaign styles are not given goals but rather strategic reactions to specific 
electoral incentives. Under certain conditions, party-driven campaigns will 
appear as the most promising strategy to implement the goal to be elected. 
In a different electoral context, individualised strategies of campaigning 
might seem most promising to candidates.
German voters have two votes associated with two different tiers of the 
electoral system, suggesting two different modes o f candidacy (Kaiser 2002). 
They cast a candidate vote in the SMD tier and a party vote in the PR tier for 
a closed party list (Gschwend et al. 2003; Gschwend 2007). Roughly half of 
the German Bundestag is thus elected via a candidate vote in a single-member 
district; the other half is elected via a party list in a multi-member district. This 
latter mode of candidacy stresses the party factor and provides incentives for a 
party-driven type of campaign. This is because candidates run as 
representatives of their parties in multi-member districts without being 
directly accountable to their voters. In contrast to this, the former mode of 
candidacy provides incentives for individualised campaign behaviour. It 
establishes a direct and visible relationship between a geographic subset of 
voters on the one hand and a particular candidate on the other. Such a 
relationship might result in an ‘identification effect’ on the part of the 
representative which translates into behavioural predispositions.
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The distinction between the two modes of candidacy is rather simplistic if 
we aim to measure the impact of electoral incentives on campaign 
behaviour. This relationship needs to be further refined with regard to the 
structure o f the competition in German single-member districts. We firstly 
assume with Pekkanen et aL (2006) that the district mode of candidacy 
overrides the list mode in cases of double candidacies, which is a legal and 
frequently practised option in the German electoral system. We secondly 
assume that the intensity of the incentive for individualised campaigning 
increases with the chance to win the candidate vote. The chance to win a 
district should have an effect on campaign behaviour independent of the 
mode of candidacy. The assumed effects can be explained and modelled in 
the following ways.
The direct mode of candidacy will have a rather weak effect on campaign 
behaviour if there are only slight chances to win the candidate vote. In this 
case, we expect few differences between candidates running on party lists on 
the one hand and candidates running in districts on the other. Only those 
district candidates who have a fair chance to win the mandate will be subject 
to strong incentives to adopt individualised campaign strategies. How do 
candidates calculate their chances to win? The chance to win a candidate 
vote should be first and foremost considered by incumbents to be high. But 
non-incumbents should be subject to equally strong incentives under certain 
conditions. The conditions are as follows. It is plausible to assume that non­
incumbents estimate their chances to win on the basis of the results of the 
previous elections in terms of the margin between the first and the second 
winner in the candidate vote. It is also plausible to assume that candidates 
will calculate this estimate on the basis of a threshold rather than working 
on the basis of continuous increments. If the margin was narrow in the 
previous elections, the chances to win will be considered as high and the 
incentives for an individualised campaign will increase with this estimate. If 
the margin was large, the chances to win will be considered low, with few 
incentives to run an individualised campaign.3
The assumed relationship between the chances to win a candidate vote 
and the degree of individualised campaigning can be further substantiated 
by looking at three mechanisms explaining campaign behaviour and 
connecting the two variables in causal ways. We firstly assume that narrow 
margins foster the subjective ambitions of candidates to compete, to make 
their mark and to succeed in a competitive process. The situation resembles 
a ‘horse race’ which engages everyone involved to an increasing degree the 
closer it gets. If candidates realise they have a chance of winning, they 
secondly might enter into strategic considerations. Under these conditions, 
individualised campaigns could be framed as useful strategies to mobilise the 
extra 3 or 4 per cent that are needed to win a direct mandate. In contrast to 
this, candidates without a  chance of winning know perfectly well that they 
will have to rely solely on their ability to secure a favourable list position to 
gain a mandate. Such candidates will thus be more inclined to campaign in a
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party-driven rather than in an individualised way. The possibility for double 
candidacies in the German electoral law potentially reinforces the lack of 
incentives to adopt individualised campaign strategies on the part of 
candidates without any chance to win a direct mandate. If candidates 
occupy a secure list position while at the same time running in a hopeless 
district then why should they bother to run an individualised campaign? In 
these cases, the incentive to apply individualised campaign strategies solely 
rests on the ‘identification effect’ we identified above.
Having commented on strategic considerations, we should add a note of 
caution. We know from anecdotal evidence that in the German case the 
results of the candidates’ total vote is closely watched by party officials as an 
indicator for a successful candidacy and as a criterion for allocating list 
positions in the succeeding elections. Increasing the candidate vote from 20 to 
22 per cent for example can have a indirect impact on the electoral fortunes of 
the candidate in the future and can thus be perfectly strategic in light of the 
election goal, even if there is no hope of winning the district. But such strategic 
considerations will be entirely focused on the party list and will thus only 
affect the intensity of the campaign as such but not its particular style.
Selective recruitment can be seen as a third mechanism creating a causal 
connection between the chances to win a direct mandate and the campaign 
strategy. Carty et al. (2003) argue that internal competition for a district 
nomination is stiff in those districts with chances to win the mandate. In 
these cases, attractive and ambitious candidates will enter the internal race, 
some of them with a high affinity to the district they aim to compete in. This 
provides a favourable basis for the adoption of individualised campaign 
strategies. Districts without any chance of winning will in turn fail to attract 
attractive candidates. In these cases, parties will have to parachute in 
candidates, some of them with no relationship to the district whatsoever. It 
is a highly plausible assumption that these candidates will perceive 
themselves as being solely dependent on the party and that they are more 
likely to campaign in a party-driven way. This argument brings us back to 
the role of party organisation as a factor explaining campaign behaviour.
The preceding considerations reject the previously discussed notion of 
political parties as being unitary actors determining the behaviour of their 
members on the basis of common ideologies and policy preferences (party as 
an endogenous factor). We rather perceive party organisation as a 
suggestive factor in this sense, which does leave room for strategic 
considerations. This should be especially true in times of a weakening of 
the party in the electorate. Such developments should spill over to the 
organisational level leaving parties less homogeneous in ideological terms 
(Katz and Mair 1995). Candidates who are more distant from their party in 
this respect should be more inclined to run individualised campaigns.
Our considerations on the electoral sources of campaign behaviour also 
suggest that we do not perceive party organisations as unitary actors 
determining campaign behaviour by means of negative sanctions. We rather
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perceive party organisation in this sense as an incentive structure which 
patterns the choices of candidates but which nevertheless leaves room for 
strategic considerations depending on the type of candidate. We believe in 
particular that incumbents having won a district in previous elections should 
be less vulnerable regarding their re-nomination and thus more autonomous 
regarding their campaign style. This assumption is supported by three 
theoretical considerations that can be drawn from the literature.
Incumbents4 possess first and foremost resources which can be side­
tracked for campaign purposes. In the German case this does not primarily 
apply to budget and personnel. Incumbents that have been elected via party 
lists are entitled to a similar level of support as their counterparts who have 
been elected in direct ways. But Stratmann and Baur (2002) demonstrated 
for the German Bundestag that direct mandates are able to secure a different 
kind of pay-off in terms of resources. They show that direct mandates are 
more likely to lead to particular committee assignments which can be used 
to  extract benefits for the district. Incumbents with a direct mandate are in 
this sense better off in terms of resources compared with their counterparts 
who have been elected via the party list. They can use their committee 
assignments to form a close relationship with their constituents by bringing 
money or infrastructure back to the district. Such successes can be used in 
the campaign to stress the profile of a good constituency member and to 
develop some independence from the party. This argument must be made 
with some qualifications though. Committee assignments are controlled by 
the party caucus and thus are not independent of party and party loyalty. 
Resources flowing from committee assignments therefore allow only limited 
leeway with regard to individualised campaign strategies.
Secondly, incumbents enjoy a relatively secure and independent political 
basis providing significant incentives to campaign in individualised ways. 
Roberts (1988) argues with respect to this issue that any type of incumbency 
(candidate and list) provides high electoral security in the German case. He 
nevertheless concedes that directly elected MPs enjoy a competitive edge in 
terms of electoral security. Manow (2007) underscores this argument in a 
more recent analysis on turnover in the German Bundestag. He 
demonstrates a higher electoral security of directly elected incumbents 
compared to those incumbents that entered the German Parliament via a 
party list. These observations are in line with analyses on the nomination 
process. Bernhard Wessels (1997: 79f.), for example, found a lower level of 
conflict in the nominations of direct candidates. The ability to win a district 
carries some weight and reputation within the larger party organisation 
which directly translates into status and electoral security.
Our case for incumbency does not so much focus on electoral security in 
itself but on the question of who is guaranteeing security: the party 
leadership on the national and regional level or the local constituency. 
Poguntke (1994: 188f.) and Detterbeck (2002: 85), summarising the 
common wisdom for the German case, stress a relatively high degree of
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decentralisation of the nomination process for district nominations 
compared to list nominations. A recent exploratory study by Schuttemeyer 
and Sturm (2005: 546) for the 2002 campaign supports this argument. On 
the basis of this observation, it is plausible to assume that directly elected 
incumbents should be largely dependent on their constituents in terms of re- 
election while candidates elected via the party list are more vulnerable to 
interference from upper levels of the party organisation. This general 
argument finds empirical support in a survey of 315 members of the German 
Bundestag conducted by Bernhard Wessels (1997). This survey demon­
strates that MPs elected via the party list place a higher priority on party 
contacts as a prerequisite for their re-election compared to incumbents who 
have been directly elected.
Thirdly, incumbency in the district guarantees a higher visibility and 
better access to the mass media and the voting public, facilitating 
individualised campaign strategies. This argument can be loosely supported 
by empirical evidence from the American case. Prior (2006) argues that the 
growth of television contributed to the rise in the incumbency advantage in 
US House elections during the 1960s. According to his analysis, incumbents 
received positive coverage throughout their term and were generally more 
newsworthy and better funded than their challengers during the campaign. 
We should assume for the German case that incumbents enjoy better 
access to the local mass media. We also know that incumbents benefit more 
from split votes compared with non-incumbents, indicating a relatively 
high recognition level and better access to the voting public (Roberts 2002: 
239).
Our theoretical considerations raise questions regarding their validity for 
candidates representing small parties with little chance to win a district. 
From a theoretical perspective, this question can be answered affirmatively. 
The chances of winning a district form an independent part of our model 
and we thus expect a relatively low degree of individualisation within this 
group of candidates. In spite of this, we expect a moderate degree of 
variance even in this group depending on the mode of candidacy. The 
expected positive relationship between mode of candidacy and individua­
lised campaign styles should be established in these cases via the subjective 
identification of candidates with the particular districts they are competing 
in.
Data, Measures and Hypotheses
The following analysis is based on the German Candidate Study 2005 (GCS 
2005). The study is a  postal survey of all 2,346 district and party-list 
candidates of the five parties represented in the German Bundestag in 2005: 
the Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), Free 
Democrats (FDP), Greens and the Socialist Party (Left.PDS). The majority 
of candidates, namely 1,050 (45 per cent), were double candidacies,
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competing in a particular district as well as on a party list. Only 434 (18 per 
cent) of all candidates solely ran in one of the 299 electoral districts and 862 
(37 per cent) competed only on a respective party list. The response rate of 
our survey with 1,032 completed questionnaires (44 per cent) was more than 
satisfactory. 669 district candidates and 363 party-list candidates did 
participate.5
The model we will test in the following analysis includes the four 
independent variables discussed above. First, we distinguish candidates 
according to their modes o f candidacy as district candidates (=  1) or as party- 
list candidates (=  0). Two-thirds of the realised sample are district candidates 
by our definition (N =  669) and the remaining one-third (N =  363) are party- 
list candidates. Second, we further differentiate district candidates according 
to their chance o f winning the district race in hopefuls (=  1) and hopeless (= 0) 
candidates: 21 per cent (N =  143) of all district candidates in our sample are 
hopeful candidates. Third, we differentiate district candidates according to 
their status. We distinguish between incumbents (= 1) and all other candidates 
(=  0). The share of incumbents (N =  74) among all district candidates is 11 per 
cent and about 52 per cent among the hopeful candidates.
In order to measure the degree to which individual candidates are 
ideologically proximal to their party we compute fourthly the absolute 
difference of a candidate’s self-placement on a typical eleven-point left/right 
scale from the perceived position of his or her party on this scale. We 
operationalise a party’s perceived ideological position as the mean value of 
party placement scores from all candidates of this party in our sample. 
Apart from less than a handful of exceptions that deviate up to four points 
on this scale, the majority of candidates do not deviate more than a single 
point from the ideological position of their respective party on the 
underlying left/right scale.
In the following we test our hypotheses by running several regressions 
with our independent variables on different indicators that measure 
individualised campaigns and that are taken from the GCS 2005.6 Above, 
we defined individualised campaigns in an ideal-typical way envisioning 
candidates who subjectively seek personal votes (campaign norm) on the 
basis of a candidate-centred organisation, a candidate-centred campaign 
agenda and candidate-centred means of campaigning. We measure the 
different concepts in this definition in the following ways.
To get at the prevailing campaign norm we asked for the candidates’ 
assessment on a ten-point scale whether the main goal of their campaign was 
to maximise attention to their party (=  1) as opposed to themselves as 
candidates (=  10). Again, the assumption that candidates wish to separate 
themselves from their party in a normative sense represents an extreme in a 
continuum that we use to measure the prevailing campaign norm. We do not 
expect many candidates to coincide with this extreme. We rather expect 
candidates to approach this extreme in gradual ways and we expect 
candidates to differ in this respect.
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In terms of campaign means we measure individualised campaigns by 
asking for the production of personalised campaign materials such as flyers 
or campaign posters by the candidate him- or herself as well as for the 
number of public appearances of party elites in support of a district 
candidate. It is rather common in German federal election campaigns that 
national party organisations produce flyers, posters and other campaign 
material and subsequently make them available to their candidates free of 
charge or for a small service charge (Boll and Poguntke 1992: 128ff.). 
Candidates running individualised campaigns should produce at least some 
campaign material downplaying their party affiliation through design or 
content. Taken to its extremes, individualised campaigning might lead to the 
total separation of candidate and party image in the public eye. In order to 
get at this we created a dummy scoring T  if a candidate produced campaign 
material independent of his or her party and ‘O’ otherwise.
Individualised campaign agendas should highlight issues that are relevant 
for the particular constituencies. To measure this concept, we created a 
dummy scoring T  if candidates reported that they highlighted issues in their 
local campaign that were not covered by the campaign agenda of their 
party. All negative responses were consequently coded ‘O’.
We finally measure individualised campaign organisations through the 
structure of the campaign budget. Money is the lifeblood of every campaign. 
It moreover creates ties and dependencies which should reflect on campaign 
organisation. The GCS 2005 asks candidates about the share of party 
contributions to their total campaign budget as opposed to personal 
contributions and campaign donations coming from third parties. We 
interpret decreasing shares of party contributions as an indicator for 
increasing independence from party structures and thus as a measure for 
increasing individualisation of local campaigns.
To sum up, in the following analysis we expect to find a relationship 
between electoral incentives stemming from Germany’s mixed-member 
electoral system and campaign behaviour. The subtle and differentiated 
impact of a number of different incentives should create a hierarchy among 
the candidates in terms of individualisation. Compared to party-list 
candidates, district candidates should have stronger incentives -  and even 
more so if they are hopefuls -  to individualise their campaigns. Moreover, to 
point out the extremes of this hierarchy, incumbents should possess the 
strongest incentives to run an individualised campaign while party-list 
candidates should have the weakest incentives to operate in this style.
Local Campaigns in the German Federal Election 2005
Figure 1 shows quite some variation in the prevailing campaign norms. 
Every fourth candidate aims to draw the utmost attention to his or her party 
rather than to him- or herself. But 5 per cent of the candidates report that 
their main campaign goal was to maximise attention to themselves rather
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F I G U R E  1
D R A W I N G  A T T E N T I O N  TO T H E IR  PARTY OR THEMSELVES?
than to their party. If we divide up our ten-point scale into two halves, and if 
we perceive candidates locating themselves between 1 and 5 as sharing party- 
centred norms and, conversely, candidates locating themselves between scale 
values 6 and 10 as sharing candidate-centred norms, we find 30 per cent of all 
candidates falling into this second category.
In order to test our hypotheses on the electoral sources of campaign 
norms we present the regression results in Table 1. Two of our three 
hypothesised incentives, the mode of candidacy as well as the chance of 
winning the district seem to systematically determine the prevailing 
campaign norm. Although low in absolute value, district candidates locate 
themselves on average at about 3.8 (=  1.367 +  2.488) on the underlying ten- 
point scale. This is significantly higher than party candidates who locate 
themselves on average at about 2.5. Our analysis nevertheless reveals that 
even district candidates still run a party-centred rather than a candidate- 
centred campaign. Besides the mode of candidacy additional incentives are 
needed in order to change the prevailing party-centred campaign norm into 
a candidate-centred one. The chance of winning the electoral district seems 
to be decisive in that regard.
Table 1 shows a statistically significant difference between hopeful and 
hopeless candidates. The size of the ‘chance of winning effect’ is on average 
almost three points on the scale and, therefore, more than twice as much as 
the incentive that stems from the mode of candidacy. Hopeful district 
candidates are predicted to locate themselves at about 6.6 on the underlying
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TA BLE  1
C A M P A I G N  N O R M  D E P E N D I N G  O N  THE MODE OF C A N D I D A C Y ,  THE CHANCE
OF W I N N I N G  A N D  I N C U M B E N C Y
Campaign norm
Mode of candidacy (district =  1) 1.367***
(0.168)
Chance of winning (hopeful =  1) 2.831***
(0.273)
Status (incumbency =  1) 0.494
(0.350)
Ideological proximity 0.193**
(0.095)
Constant 2.488***
(0.164)
Note: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Data source: GCS 2005, N  =  963.
ten-point scale. While incumbents do in fact place themselves higher on this 
scale the incumbency status does not seem to play an additional role in 
explaining campaign norms. Finally we find as expected that candidates who 
are more distant ideologically from their party report a more candidate- 
centred campaign norm. Although statistically significant, this effect is 
rather small substantively. Even the candidates with the largest reported 
deviation from the ideological position of their party place themselves on 
average not even a scale point higher in terms of the prevailing campaign 
norm than typical candidates of their party.
In the second step of our analysis, we are able to demonstrate that 
electoral incentives in Germany's mixed-member system also affect the 
means of campaigning. Almost 46 per cent of all candidates report to have 
produced campaign material independent of their party. The logistic 
regression analysis reported in Table 2 demonstrates the electoral sources 
of these choices.
The estimated coefficients reported in Table 2 support our hypotheses 
regarding the impact of the electoral system. The coefficients of our two 
indicators measuring the electoral incentive structure are positive and 
statistically significant as expected. Party organisation plays out in a more 
subtle and differentiated way. While incumbency shows the expected 
positive effect, we draw blank on ideological proximity. In order to interpret 
these coefficients substantively we calculate predicted probabilities to assess 
the degree to which different types of candidates are expected to produce 
campaign material independent of their party.8 Party-list candidates are 
predicted with a probability of 19 per cent to produce campaign material 
independently. This probability rises, as expected, to 55 per cent for district 
candidates, 71 per cent for hopeful district candidates and 89 per cent for 
incumbents. The use of independently produced campaign material is 
supposedly quite common among candidates competing in an electoral
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TABLE 2
P R E D IC T IN G  THE P R O D U C T I O N  OF I N D E P E N D E N T  C A M P A I G N  M A T E R I A L  AS 
A F U N C T I O N  OF M O D E  OF C A N D I D A C Y ,  CH AN CE OF W I N N I N G  A N D
I N C U M B E N C Y
Independently produced 
campaign material (1 — yes; 0 =  no)
Mode of candidacy (district = 1) 1.631***
(0.164)
Chance of winning (hopeful = 1) 0.733**
(0.285)
Status (incumbency =  1) 1.256***
(0.482)
Ideological proximity -0.025
(0.087)
Constant -1.413***
(0.169)
Note: Entries are unstandardised logit coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*p <  .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Data source: GCS 2005, N  =  996.
district. Even a majority of candidates facing hopeless district races is 
predicted to produce campaign material independent of their party. The 
popularity of this campaign strategy increases with the strength of the 
incentives stemming from the electoral system.
In the third step of our analysis we are interested in the agendas of local 
campaigns. Almost every second candidate (49 per cent) highlighted issues 
that are relevant for his or her particular constituency but were not covered 
by the campaign of his or her party. In order to provide an answer to the 
question whether incentives of the electoral system are responsible for this 
we estimate a logistic regression model. Table 3 summarises our estimation 
results.
The estimated coefficients support our expectations and are in line with 
the previous results regarding the effect of the electoral system on the 
prevailing campaign norm and the independent production of campaign 
material. The two indicators measuring electoral incentives -  namely the 
mode of candidacy and the chance of winning a district -  increase the 
likelihood of running on the basis of an independent campaign agenda. 
Compared to the previous analyses, the story changes slightly regarding 
party organisation. Incumbents are not systematically different from 
hopeful district candidates regarding the structure of their campaign 
agenda, while ideological proximity shows the expected effect.
In order to substantively interpret our logit estimates we take a look at the 
predicted probability based on the above model.9 While party-list 
candidates have a predicted probability of 34 per cent to run on an 
independent campaign agenda, a majority of hopeless district candidates (54 
per cent) are predicted to do so too. The likelihood of having an 
independent campaign agenda increases with hopeful candidates. Two out
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TA BLE  3
P R E D I C T I N G  W H E T H E R  OR N OT  C A N D I D A T E S  H I G H L I G H T E D  RELEV ANT  
ISSUES N OT  C O V E R E D  BY P A R T Y  AS A F U N C T I O N  OF M O D E  OF C A N D I D A C Y ,  
C H A N C E  OF W I N N I N G  A N D  I N C U M B E N C Y
Highlighted relevant issues 
not covered by party (1 =  yes; 0 =  no)
Mode of candidacy (district = 1) 0,830***
(0.150)
Chance of winning (hopeful = 1) 0.516*
(0.276)
Status (incumbency =  1) 0.074
(0367)
Ideological proximity 0.151*
(0.082)
Constant -0.820***
(0.151)
Note: Entries are unstandardised regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*p < .1; **p <  .05; ***p < .01.
Data source: GCS 2005, N  =  956.
of three respondents that fall into this category (66 per cent) are predicted to 
stress issues that are relevant for their district but not covered by their party. 
We also find that deviating policy preferences of candidates from those of 
their party has only a small impact on the candidates’ campaign agenda. 
Typical candidates with an average deviation from the ideological position 
of their party are only between three (for hopeful candidates) and four (for 
party-list and hopeless candidates alike) percentage points more likely to 
highlight an issue not covered by their party than their colleagues who 
match the ideological position of their respective party. Thus ideological 
proximity does not lead a typical candidate to promote or suppress an 
individualised campaign agenda if not otherwise motivated through the 
incentives that are provided by the electoral system.
In a fourth step of our analysis, we focus on the organisation of local 
campaigns measured by the candidates’ dependency on party funds. Figure 2 
presents a histogram of the share of party funds of the total campaign 
budget as reported by the candidates surveyed through the GCS 2005. Many 
candidates apparently do not get any or very little financial contribution 
from their party while others almost exclusively rely on party-sponsored 
funds as opposed to third-party donations or personal funds.
W hat is the relationship between the share of party funds and the electoral 
incentive structure? In Table 4 we present the results of a linear regression 
model predicting the share of party funds on the total campaign budget. 
Party list candidates, indicated by the coefficient of the constant, rely on 
average only about a third (35 per cent) on party-sponsored funds. About 
two-thirds of the total budget for those candidates is coming from other 
sources. Contrary to our expectation, party funds represent on average the 
largest source for the hopeless district candidates (57% =35% +22% ).
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F I G U R E  2
S HA RE OF P A R T Y  F U N D S  ON TOTAL C A M P A I G N  B U D G E T
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TA B L E  4
P R E D I C T I N G  THE SH A R E  OF P A R T Y  F U N D S  ON THE TOTAL C A M P A I G N  
B U D G E T  AS A F U N C T I O N  OF M O D E  OF C A N D I D A C Y ,  C H A N C E  OF W I N N I N G
A N D  I N C U M B E N C Y
Share of party funds
Mode of candidacy (district =  1) 21.906***
(3.054)
Chance of winning (hopeful =  1) -5.498
(4.107)
Status (incumbency =  1) -16.200***
(5.219)
Ideological proximity -2.999**
(1.446)
Constant 35.258***
(3.082)
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Data source: GCS 2005, N  =  789.
Although not quite significant, hopeful candidates have a tendency to rely 
less on party money than hopeless candidates because they might make an 
effort to raise more donations and they are more willing to spend their own 
money. Table 4 demonstrates the expected effect regarding party organisa­
tion. Incumbents are able to reduce the share of party funds compared to
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candidates running in a district. Only about a third (=  57% -  8% -  16%) of 
an average incumbent’s total budget depends on money coming from his or 
her party. We further find strong support that candidates who are 
ideologically distant from their party depend significantly less on party 
funds to run their campaign. This effect amounts to about three percentage 
points less party funds for a typical candidate who deviates about one scale 
point away from his or her party. Thus, we find that the stronger the 
incentives for district candidates to run an individualised campaign the less 
dependent their campaign budget is on party funds.
In the remainder of our analysis we wish to see whether the relationship 
between electoral incentives, party organisation and campaign behaviour 
holds for candidates of small parties and for candidates of major parties in 
the same way. In light of our theoretical expectation, party should not add 
anything to our analysis. We wish to test this assumption in the following. 
In a first step, we replicate the previous analyses for the sub-sample of those 
candidates representing the three small parties (FDP, Greens, and 
Left.PDS). This analysis produces no important differences at all. The 
estimated coefficients for the mode of candidacy are not substantively 
different from those presented above. This implies that the supposed 
‘identification effect’ between district candidates and their local constituency 
operates on district candidates of small parties as well. Moreover, with only 
one exception, in the realised sample we do not have hopeful candidates or 
incumbents of small parties. Therefore we cannot identify these effects in the 
sub-sample of small party candidates.
Another possibility to check for a ‘party effect’ is to replicate our previous 
analyses while controlling for party size by including a dummy variable 
scoring ‘1’ if the candidate belongs to a small party and ‘0’ if he or she 
belongs to a major party (CDU/CSU or SPD). Table 5 provides an overview 
of the results of this analysis. The coefficient of party size is significant in 
three of our four models. While having an independent campaign agenda 
seems to be unrelated to party size, party size does systematically affect the 
campaign norm, the means of campaigning (independently produced 
materials) and the share of party funds.10
Controlling for party size does add to the picture drawn previously. We 
can say that small party candidates systematically locate themselves lower 
on the underlying ten-point scale compared to major party candidates, 
indicating a roughly one-point smaller baseline level regarding the prevailing 
campaign norm. While the effects for the mode of candidacy and 
incumbency can be successfully replicated in all four regressions without 
qualitatively changing the findings in this regard, controlling for party size, 
however, merely eliminates the expected difference between hopeful but 
non-incumbent candidates and hopeless district candidates for the produc­
tion of party-independent campaign material. The ‘chance of winning’ effect 
found previously seems to originate in the size of the candidate’s party 
rather than in incentives of the electoral system.
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TA BLE  5
REP LIC ATI ON OF P R E V IO U S A N A L Y S I S  CONTROLL ED FOR P A R T Y  SIZE
Campaign
norm
Independently
produced
campaign
material
Highlighted 
relevant 
issues not 
covered 
by party
Share of 
party 
funds
Mode of candidacy (district = 1) 1.729*** 1.828*** 0.802*** 18.389***
(0.188) (0.195) (0.167) (3.213)
Chance of winning (hopeful = 1) 2.016*** 0.330 0.576* 3.385
(0.329) (0.331) (0.316) (5.065)
Status (incumbency =  1) 0.510 1.265*** 0.073 -16.375***
(0.353) (0.483) (0.367) (5.200)
Ideological proximity 0.165* -0.040 0.154* -2.803*
(0.096) (0.088) (0.082) (1.461)
Party size (small party =  1) -0.927*** -0.459** 0.069 10.188***
(0.205) (0.195) (0.178) (3.432)
Constant 2.969*** -1.192*** -0.856*** 29.695***
(0.194) (0.186) (0.171) (3.660)
N 963 996 956 789
Note: Entries are unstandardised regression or logit coefficients, robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *p <  .1; **p <  .05; ***p <  .01.
Data source: GCS 2005.
Conclusion and discussion
The preceding analysis of constituency campaigns in the German 
parliamentary elections 2005 demonstrated considerable differences in the 
style of campaigning. We were able to prove the existence of an 
individualised style of campaigning in contrast to a party-centred campaign 
style at various levels of analysis. A significant number of candidates 
favoured the norm that their campaign activities should focus the voters’ 
attention on their own person rather than on the party. A significant 
number of candidates ran their campaign on the basis of an agenda and an 
organisational structure that pointed in the direction of being candidate 
centred. A significant number of candidates used means of campaigning that 
were designed to increase the visibility of the candidate by downplaying his 
or her own party. Individualised campaigns at the constituency level are no 
exceptions to the rule but rather more general phenomena that come in 
different shapes and different levels of intensity.
The preceding multivariate analyses demonstrate a clear relationship 
between the style of campaigning on the one hand and electoral as well as 
party organisational incentives on the other. They furthermore show that 
different forms of incentives work with different effects and at different levels 
of intensity. The direct mode of candidacy exercises a visible incentive on 
candidates to adopt individualised forms of campaigning across most 
indicators we used. As expected, the chance to win a direct mandate 
provides a further incentive to candidates to campaign in individualised
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ways. This relationship is however restricted to certain effects at the level of 
campaigning. It only holds with regard to the norm of campaigning and the 
campaign agenda if we control for the size of party.
The preceding analysis also demonstrates a relationship between party 
organisational factors and the style of campaigning. Incumbents with a 
higher degree of electoral security are more likely to campaign on the basis 
of independently produced campaign material and their campaign budget 
includes a lower share of party funds. Low ideological proximity increases 
the likelihood of an individualised campaign in terms of campaign norm and 
campaign materials used. It also results in a lower share of party funds in the 
overall campaign budget. These findings raise the question why electoral 
and party organisational factors only interact with some forms of campaign 
behaviour and not with others.
The secular effects of specific electoral incentives can be explained in an 
ad-hoc fashion with reference to a systematic split between campaign norms 
and rhetoric on the one hand and manifest campaign behaviour on the 
other. It is plausible to assume that incumbency bears no effect at the level of 
norms and rhetoric for very good reasons. Incumbents enjoy in most cases a 
high status within the party organisation that oftentimes translates into 
leadership positions. Incumbents should therefore feel more loyal to their 
party and they should have better access to the decision-making process in 
their own party. As a consequence, there should be less tension and conflict 
between the party programme and the policy beliefs of incumbents. This 
reduces the need to develop a campaign norm and a campaign rhetoric 
stressing independence. Incumbents possess the means to run an individua­
lised campaign, but they do not necessarily possess good reasons to do so. 
This ad-hoc explanation suggests that incumbency will have the expected 
impact on campaign norms and campaign agendas only in cases where 
incumbents are backbenchers in parliament at the same time as being cut off 
from access to the decision-making process in their own party. A closer 
analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
The systematic divergence between norms and rhetoric on the one hand 
and manifest behaviour on the other can be explained in a reverse way for 
candidates with a chance to win in the district where they are running. It is 
plausible to assume that we see in this group a larger number of candidates 
who experience a high degree of tension and conflict with their party because 
of lack of access to decision-making processes. This should lead through 
interaction with electoral incentives to individualised campaign norms and 
rhetorics. It does not go any further, because, in contrast to incumbents, 
many of these candidates do not possess the means to raise private money 
and to produce campaign material independently. They are thus not able to 
implement their norm and their campaign agenda. Specific incentives do not 
work in a one-dimensional and efficient way at the behavioural level. 
They are rather part of a complex configuration of a larger number of 
incentives.
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The previous analysis raises a second question that concerns the effect of 
party size on constituency campaigns. What kind of mechanisms and 
incentives that we have not touched upon in our theoretical section generate 
this effect? A plausible ad-hoc explanation concerns the different opportunity 
structures that are related to different party sizes. In Germany, large parties 
have a better developed local basis in terms of members and established 
organisational networks compared to the smaller parties. This local basis 
provides an opportunity structure for district candidates determined to run a 
highly individualised campaign. These grassroots could supply manpower 
and expertise for such campaigns. The effect of this opportunity structure is 
eventually dependent on the question of the relationship between individual 
candidates and their local party branch. Taking advantage of local party 
structures to launch individualised campaigns requires a candidate to control 
and dominate the party grassroots to some degree. A further discussion of 
this relationship for the German case is beyond the scope of the paper. But 
vital grassroots do provide a potential opportunity structure for individua­
lised campaigns and German parties differ in this area according to their size. 
This suggests that the measured effect of size is partly based on differences in 
the opportunities for grassroots mobilisation.
From the perspective of political communication research, individualised 
campaigns are an important subject matter per se. The systematic 
description of such campaigns and the explanation of national and cross­
national differences define an important research agenda in itself. But we 
also perceive individualised campaigns as a phenomenon that might have 
spill-over effects at the level of party organisation and legislative behaviour. 
We assume that individualised campaigns do matter in this respect. It is 
beyond the scope of this analysis to investigate these effects. But we will 
conclude with some speculative considerations on this issue with the aim to 
identify related phenomena at the level of party organisation, parliamentary 
behaviour and voting behaviour.
Local candidates and local campaign organisations running individua­
lised campaigns could indicate and further facilitate the coming of a 
franchise type of party (Carty 2004). Such parties are envisioned to be made 
up of actors using the party name as a brand in return for basic loyalty, 
while keeping a large degree of independence from the upper level of party 
organisation. In the context of the franchise concept, independence will be 
thus limited and restrained, but in a very loose and general fashion. The 
respect candidates pay for such constraints will be ‘part of the deal’, a 
resource given in exchange for the brand name. Further research on local 
campaigns would have to analyse the exact terms of trade, reconciling at this 
empirical level the paradox of increasingly democratic parties affording at 
the same time more autonomy and power in their role as parties in public 
office (Mair 1994: 16).
Individualised campaigns could also strengthen the weight of MPs within 
their parties in the process of parliamentary decision-making. In the past,
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parties in parliament already provided safety valves and controlled 
independence for their MPs to please their voters in the district. Individual 
MPs were always able to provide some service for their constituents and 
they were always able to defect from their party in cases of a dramatic 
conflict between constituency interests and party position, and if majorities 
were not at stake. But these boundaries could be pushed back further as a 
result of individualised campaign behaviour. Candidates having campaigned 
in an individualised fashion, subjectively owing their election greatly to a 
personal vote, could become much more assertive towards the parliamen­
tary party in the pursuance of constituency interests. Party cohesion could 
decline as a result of such assertiveness.
The envisioned impact of individualised campaign behaviour on party 
organisation and legislative behaviour is not without prerequisites. As we 
argued in this paper, the electoral system and the degree to which it allows 
for a personal vote is one crucial prerequisite for individualised campaign 
behaviour and possibly also for any further impact. We would assume that 
the process of candidate selection and the further developments of 
electoral markets and voting behaviour are two other crucial prerequisites 
for the rise of individualised politics. If voters react to individualised 
campaigning by increasingly casting personal votes, this could serve as an 
incentive for future individual assertiveness on the part of candidates and 
MPs. If parties further decentralise and even democratise candidate 
selection as a reaction to the increasing number of personal votes, the 
terms of trade could rapidly turn against them in their own franchise and 
the emerging patterns of individualised campaigning could spell doom in 
the long run.
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Notes
1. We wish to distinguish the concept of individualised campaigning from the concept of 
personalised campaigning as used among others in Brettschneider (2002) or Poguntke and 
Webb (2005). The latter concept focuses solely on the content of campaigns at the national 
level, while the former focuses on the structural implications of post-modern campaigns 
embracing the national and the local level. We also wish to emphasise that our concept 
focuses on the elite level. Asp and Esaiasson (1996) have used the term with respect to the 
voter level.
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2. The term ‘Americanisation’ is used in different definitions throughout the debate. Swanson 
and Mancini (1996: 5f.) define the concept through: ‘particular types and elements of 
election campaigns and professional activities connected with them that were first 
developed in the United States and are now being applied and adapted in various 
ways in other countries’. For these authors, the concept signifies a particular process, 
namely the process of the diffusion of campaign strategies.
3. This is a frequently used assumption in the literature. A 10 per cent threshold to distinguish 
between safe and competitive districts is used e.g. by Turner (1953) or for the German case 
by Schmitt and Wiist (2002). The New York Times uses this criterion, too, for electoral 
district predictions.
4. In the German context, the incumbency category could also include candidates elected via 
the party list in the previous elections. We exclude this group for reasons explained in the 
theoretical section of the paper. Incumbents in a district enjoy the highest degree of 
electoral security.
5. The realised sample largely represents the population. The following provides evidence for 
this. In the realised sample the distribution of candidates by party does systematically 
deviate from a theoretically expected uniform distribution (SPD 18 per cent; CDU/CSU 21 
per cent; FDP 20 per cent; Greens 20 per cent; Left.PDS 21 per cent); the mean age of the 
candidates in the realised sample as well as in the population of all candidates of these 
parties are identical (46 years); even when considering the mode of candidacy, the 
distribution in the realised sample (35 per cent party-list-only candidates; 20 per cent are 
district-only candidates) is essentially the same as in the population (37 per cent party-list- 
only candidates; 19 per cent are district-only candidates). The share of double candidacies 
in the realised sample is the same as in the population (45 per cent). Moreover, the realised 
sample realistically reflects the rate of incumbents to non-incumbents (7:93) compared to 
the one in the population (11:89).
6. Denver et ah (2004) study constituency campaign intensity in Britain and use a composite 
index based on a series of post-election surveys of constituency campaign organisers. Given 
that we are dealing with a new theoretical phenomenon, namely individualised campaigns, 
whose construct validity has still to be established, we decide against constructing a 
summary measure. Nevertheless, and as expected, our dependent variables used in this 
study do scale together nicely. A factor analysis of these variables retains only one factor 
with an eigenvalue greater than one. Thus our dependent variables can be interpreted as 
indicators of the same latent construct ‘individualised campaign’.
7. Substantively we get the same results when running an ordinal logit model instead.
8. In  order to calculate the predicted probabilities we fix ideological proximity at its sample 
mean.
9. Again, we fix ideological proximity at its sample mean in order to compute the predicted 
probabilities.
10. We also conducted further robustness test of our models and included controls for 
candidates’ gender and age in all our regression models without substantively changing the 
results.
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